Again, that may at least in part be a function of how history was written. The Luddite wikipedia link includes this:
> Malcolm L. Thomas argued in his 1970 history “The Luddites” that machine-breaking was one of the very few tactics that workers could use to increase pressure on employers, undermine lower-paid competing workers, and create solidarity among workers. "These attacks on machines did not imply any necessary hostility to machinery as such; machinery was just a conveniently exposed target against which an attack could be made."[10] Historian Eric Hobsbawm has called their machine wrecking "collective bargaining by riot", which had been a tactic used in Britain since the Restoration because manufactories were scattered throughout the country, and that made it impractical to hold large-scale strikes.
Of course, there would have been people who just saw it as striking back at the machines, and leaders who took advantage of that tendency, but the point is it probably wasn’t as simple as the popular accounts suggest.
Also, there’s a kind of corollary to the lump of labor fallacy, which is arguably a big reason the US is facing such a significant political upheaval today: when you disturb the labor status quo, it takes time - potentially even generations - for the economy to adjust and adapt, and many people can end up relatively worse off as a result. Most US factory workers and miners didn’t end up with good service industry jobs, for example.
Sure, at a macro level an economist viewing the situation from 30,000 feet sees no problem - meanwhile on the ground, you end up with millions of people ready to vote for a wannabe autocrat who promises to make things the way they were. Trying to treat economics as a discipline separate from politics, sociology, and psychology in these situations can be misleading.
> [...] undermine lower-paid competing workers, and create solidarity among workers.
Nice 'solidarity' there!
> Most US factory workers and miners didn’t end up with good service industry jobs, for example.
Which people are you talking about? More specifically, when?
As long as overall unemployment stays low and the economy keeps growing, I don't see much of a problem. Even if you tried to keep everything exactly as is, you'll always have some people who do better and some who do worse; even if just from random chance. It's hard to blame that on change.
See eg how the draw down of the domestic construction industry around 2007 was handled: construction employment fell over time, but overall unemployment was low and flat. Indicating an orderly shuffling around of workers from construction into the wider economy. (As a bonus point, contrast with how the Fed unnecessarily tanked the wider economy a few months after this re-allocation of labour had already finished.)
> Sure, at a macro level an economist viewing the situation from 30,000 feet sees no problem - meanwhile on the ground, you end up with millions of people ready to vote for a wannabe autocrat who promises to make things the way they were. Trying to treat economics as a discipline separate from politics, sociology, and psychology in these situations can be misleading.
It would help immensely, if the Fed were more competent in preventing recessions. Nominal GDP level targeting would help to keep overall spending in the economy on track.
The Fed is capable of doing no such thing. They can soften or delay recessions by socializing mistakes and redistributing wealth using interest rates, but an absence of recessions would imply perfect market participants.
> [...] but an absence of recessions would imply perfect market participants.
No, not at all. What makes you think so? Israel (and to a lesser extent Australia) managed to skip the Great Recession on account of having competent central banks. But they didn't have any more 'perfect' market participants than any other economy.
Russia, of all places, also shows right now what a competent central bank can do for your economy---the real situation is absolutely awful on account of the 'special military operation' and the sanctions both financial and kinetic. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elvira_Nabiullina for the woman at the helm.
See also how after the Brexit referendum the Bank of England wisely let the Pound exchange rate take the hit---instead of tanking the real economy trying to defend the exchange rate.
> They can soften or delay recessions by socializing mistakes and redistributing wealth using interest rates, [...]
Btw, not all central banks even use interest rates for their policies.
You are right that the central banks are sometimes involved in bail outs, but just as often it's the treasury and other more 'fiscal' parts of the government. I don't like 'Too big to fail' either. Keeping total nominal spending on a stable path would help ease the temptation to bail out.
> Malcolm L. Thomas argued in his 1970 history “The Luddites” that machine-breaking was one of the very few tactics that workers could use to increase pressure on employers, undermine lower-paid competing workers, and create solidarity among workers. "These attacks on machines did not imply any necessary hostility to machinery as such; machinery was just a conveniently exposed target against which an attack could be made."[10] Historian Eric Hobsbawm has called their machine wrecking "collective bargaining by riot", which had been a tactic used in Britain since the Restoration because manufactories were scattered throughout the country, and that made it impractical to hold large-scale strikes.
Of course, there would have been people who just saw it as striking back at the machines, and leaders who took advantage of that tendency, but the point is it probably wasn’t as simple as the popular accounts suggest.
Also, there’s a kind of corollary to the lump of labor fallacy, which is arguably a big reason the US is facing such a significant political upheaval today: when you disturb the labor status quo, it takes time - potentially even generations - for the economy to adjust and adapt, and many people can end up relatively worse off as a result. Most US factory workers and miners didn’t end up with good service industry jobs, for example.
Sure, at a macro level an economist viewing the situation from 30,000 feet sees no problem - meanwhile on the ground, you end up with millions of people ready to vote for a wannabe autocrat who promises to make things the way they were. Trying to treat economics as a discipline separate from politics, sociology, and psychology in these situations can be misleading.