> leadership making decisions for conflicts on or around the LoC are not from these regions
The people in the region are pretty much irrelevant, one can successfuly model the conflict as a proxy war between New Delhi and Islamabad. Their interests are particular to the borders in the region, namely, access to waterm, China and the other side's Kashmir.
> ways to resolve the problem longer term, and that requires forcing professionalization of the Pakistani Armed Forces and cajoling India back to the negotiating table using the carrot and the stick. Similar precedent already exists with the Israel-Egypt peace accords under Sadat
This is a solution from a different era. The current borders are unstable and thus unsustainable. Between proxy forces and the militarisation of the South China Sea, we're kicking the can down the road until someone acts decisively.
The game theory is that kicking the can down the road works for both sides. There isn't a pressing need for peace between India and Pakistan, just not nuclear conflict. And that's achieved with a Korean Peninsula-esque stalemate. The problem is either side gaining an advantage resolves the issue, and the later that happens the more destructive the resolution would be. (Think: Pakistan gaining top-of-the-line Sino-Russian missile defence.) And both sides know that ex ante. So we have a prisoner's dilemma without the common enemy (and common ally) that animated Tel Aviv and Cairo.
The people in the region are pretty much irrelevant, one can successfuly model the conflict as a proxy war between New Delhi and Islamabad. Their interests are particular to the borders in the region, namely, access to waterm, China and the other side's Kashmir.
> ways to resolve the problem longer term, and that requires forcing professionalization of the Pakistani Armed Forces and cajoling India back to the negotiating table using the carrot and the stick. Similar precedent already exists with the Israel-Egypt peace accords under Sadat
This is a solution from a different era. The current borders are unstable and thus unsustainable. Between proxy forces and the militarisation of the South China Sea, we're kicking the can down the road until someone acts decisively.
The game theory is that kicking the can down the road works for both sides. There isn't a pressing need for peace between India and Pakistan, just not nuclear conflict. And that's achieved with a Korean Peninsula-esque stalemate. The problem is either side gaining an advantage resolves the issue, and the later that happens the more destructive the resolution would be. (Think: Pakistan gaining top-of-the-line Sino-Russian missile defence.) And both sides know that ex ante. So we have a prisoner's dilemma without the common enemy (and common ally) that animated Tel Aviv and Cairo.