Hacker Newsnew | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submitlogin

The point was not about competency. I think typical distribution packagers are very competent.

"They won't screw up" is the wrong way to look at security: humans always screw up. We're essentially fallible. We would all do well to remember that the xz backdoor was not caught by distribution code review: it was caught due to a performance side effect that the next adversary will be more careful to avoid.

Software stacks are getting bigger, largely due to engineering pressures that are outside of the control of distributions. It's a basic fact that that means work for the same (or fewer) people, which in turn means less time spent on more complicated packages. Under those conditions, competency is not the deciding factor.

This is, separately, why having lots of little packages can be (but isn't necessarily) a good thing: small packages that decompose into well-understood units of work can be reviewed more quickly and comprehensively, and can be assigned capabilities that can be tracked and audited with static analysis. You can't do that as easily (or at all) when every package decides to hand-roll its own subcomponents.



> "They won't screw up" is the wrong way to look at security: humans always screw up. We're essentially fallible.

Sure. So pick a system that includes at least one extra possible barrier to them screwing up than the system that has none.


It’s not “either or.” It’s been decades since a “package the world” approach has been practical at human scales.

(I think it’s great that distributions provide one extra set of eyes. But we’re deluding ourselves if we think that can scale to the actual realized demand for both new software and continuous change to software. It’s also not very fair to the distributions.)




Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: