If you want a non-materialist account of mind, start doing experiments where materialism fails. Otherwise, you don't have a case.

This article is a long, exquisitely-written account of why rocks fall up on Wednesday.

Verificationism isn't some stunning riposte. Call it a god in the gaps if you'd like, but there's no straightforward route from matter -> qualia.

> Verificationism isn't some stunning riposte.

No, it's the minimum required to be taken seriously.

That's a sophomoric philosophical position that is not endorsed by the majority of contemporary thinkers.

"Does my idea about how the world works have anything to do with how the world works" is precisely the kind of question we had to start asking in order to begin to understand how the world works. Just having random ideas and demanding that the world conform to them is the mark of an ill-considered thinker. Also, majoritarianism isn't how philosophy works.

Do you understand the concept of qualia? There is no known way to establish whether all/most/some of life has inner experience. That doesn’t entail dismissing the question.

From the article:

Dennett models the mind on the idea of the computer. But computers are the products of human designers. Hence it makes no sense to try to explain the mind in terms of computers, since the existence of a computer itself presupposes the existence of a designing mind.

I read no further.

It wasn't worth pushing through. The other arguments are equally as incoherent until it gets to the hard problem of consciousness, which seems to a problem for the author to explain concisely.

I had trouble earlier, but in the end that was also my stopping point.