Welp, looks like they were able to copy vaults to crack and, worse yet, they have the unencrypted URLs to choose what to target.
> The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. These encrypted fields remain secured with 256-bit AES encryption and can only be decrypted with a unique encryption key derived from each user’s master password using our Zero Knowledge architecture. As a reminder, the master password is never known to LastPass and is not stored or maintained by LastPass. The encryption and decryption of data is performed only on the local LastPass client. For more information about our Zero Knowledge architecture and encryption algorithms, please see here.
Hm, with all that talk about "zero knowledge architecture", I thought your vault file would be encrypted "in one piece", not just the passwords. If they have the URLs in clear text, that's not really zero knowledge, now is it? And why do they need the URLs anyway, when I can share the passwords just fine from my local PC? Statistics?!
Honestly, URLs are a potentially massive threat vector themselves.
Are the urls associated with individual users either directly or in a bucketed fashion? Seems like no to the former but the release leaves a lot to be desired.
LastPass is an enormous target, obviously. And, I guess, the inevitable has happened: Encrypted trove of passwords is "out there".
Let's assume one's master password is strong. And that LastPass knows how to encrypt data. We're really down to whether 256-bit AES can be brute forced, right? And I guess understanding phishing attacks.
I mean, yes, wouldn't it be great of LastPass took the measures with its development environment years ago? So put another way: Lack of operational excellence hopefully is made for in strong encryption. I hope.
contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs,
No I think this is the worst that could have happened short of loosing the clear-text passwords. Noone is going to stop the attackers from looking for high-value login URLs and than spear-phish the password for the offline vault.
Forcing a password reset onto customers is not going to help LastPass here.
'form-filled data' includes 'Payment cards' section I believe, which should then make securing your cards an even larger priority than having to change your passwords
No, as stated, they don't encrypt the URL. This is likely so that, regardless of what you have entered for your "when is master password required" settings, the browser plugin can highlight when it knows that you've entered a password for a site.
> The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. These encrypted fields remain secured with 256-bit AES encryption and can only be decrypted with a unique encryption key derived from each user’s master password using our Zero Knowledge architecture. As a reminder, the master password is never known to LastPass and is not stored or maintained by LastPass. The encryption and decryption of data is performed only on the local LastPass client. For more information about our Zero Knowledge architecture and encryption algorithms, please see here.