> can directly change the results by deliberately miscounting the results
This is why in liberal democracies the process of casting and counting votes is usually done in the presence of at least representatives of the candidates running and more usually whoever wants to attend them
You'd need total complicity in every single polling station to cheat without raising alarms
In electronic/internet voting, unless there is a paper trail which can be counted in the same manner as manual voting, all you need is government officials to tweak the code/the hardware being used. Are you going to let every candidate audit every single machine independently? Unlikely since that is, in and of itself, a security risk
> where the officials just threw out paper ballots
And since they had to physically remove material evidence we were able to get videos of it happening. Plugging an USB while the machine is in the warehouse or in the middle of voting can be done a lot more discreetly
> counting is left to individuals which will commit voter fraud
Which is why counting is usually done with supervision
The system in India works, but it works because it reduces the entire process to a paper ballot. Ultimately the security guarantees of the Indian elections are identical to the security guarantees of the traditional paper ballot system
The digital component is limited to easing the logistics of getting the first results of the election in a timely manner
Which is about the extent to which you should trust electronic voting
This is why in liberal democracies the process of casting and counting votes is usually done in the presence of at least representatives of the candidates running and more usually whoever wants to attend them
You'd need total complicity in every single polling station to cheat without raising alarms
In electronic/internet voting, unless there is a paper trail which can be counted in the same manner as manual voting, all you need is government officials to tweak the code/the hardware being used. Are you going to let every candidate audit every single machine independently? Unlikely since that is, in and of itself, a security risk
> where the officials just threw out paper ballots
And since they had to physically remove material evidence we were able to get videos of it happening. Plugging an USB while the machine is in the warehouse or in the middle of voting can be done a lot more discreetly
> counting is left to individuals which will commit voter fraud
Which is why counting is usually done with supervision
The system in India works, but it works because it reduces the entire process to a paper ballot. Ultimately the security guarantees of the Indian elections are identical to the security guarantees of the traditional paper ballot system
The digital component is limited to easing the logistics of getting the first results of the election in a timely manner
Which is about the extent to which you should trust electronic voting