It's not clear that you will need an account to see the problems. Logged in with my account and it's exactly the same page. It's not Dec 1st everywhere yet, so they might open up for everyone when they do open them up.
> A world in which Python only supported imports behaving in a lazy manner would likely be great...we do not envision the Python langauge transitioning to a world where lazy imports are the default...this concept would add complexity to our ecosystem.
Why can't lazy be the default and instead propose an `eager` syntax? The only argument I can imagine is that there's some API that runs a side effect based on importing, but perhaps making it eager for modules with side effects would be a sufficient temporary fix?
A friend of mine introduced TOML to a reasonably big open source project and he mentioned there were some unexpected downsides to it. I've asked him to chime in here, because I think he's more qualified to reply (note that I pointed him to a sibling comment that's also asking about TOML, here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45295715).
As for Apple Pkl, I think we share the goal of robustness and "toolability", but pkl seems way more complex. I personally think it's more useful to keep things simple, to avoid advancing in the configuration complexity clock (for context, see https://mikehadlow.blogspot.com/2012/05/configuration-comple...).
Regarding all the chat control posts, I've not seen any comments regarding the potential use for homomorphic encryption to abide by this law: if chat control is only used for the detection of CSAM (which is another issue in itself; Apple, for instance, already solved this with NeuraHash), then could "allowing the government to snoop" be letting them have the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext?
Disclaimer that I actually don't know what the full extent this chat control law is asking for, except for the fact that it will deeply compromise encryption
so you encrypt your image, send it to the government, the government runs its CSAM detector on the encrypted image and gets... an encrypted result.
then what? you decrypt the answer and send it back to them? promise that you totally didn't change the answer?
FHE is the wrong tool for the job. you'd want verifiable computation (e.g. ni-ZKP) instead. both are too complex and faaar too computationally expensive for actual use.
