There already exist ways to proxy those requests in ways that avoid exposing anything about the visitors to Google.
It's in the grey area wrt Google's own ToS, but then, it's that or GDPR.
I see this and I feel I must ask: why would you EVER engineer ANY application under the idiotic assumption that none of your users will ever want to remove the data that they had stored in it?!
Absolutely baffling.
Of course, if a business is that short-sighted and careless, it will struggle to implement GDPR.
Why do you think it's ironic for another highly unequal, exploitative, racist, colonialist empire to also have a yacht class?
Russia's entire GDP is less than that of New York. I highly doubt they own more stupid and planet-destroying assets than US oligarchs, or the dictators we prop up. Feel free to bring evidence of otherwise though.
Russia and most other post-Soviet countries maintained mandatory military draft, with education being one of the only non-health-related exemptions available. Because of the sad state of those armies in the 90's, 00's, and even 10's, very few young men in particular were willing to basically waste a year or so of their life, so instead nearly every male school graduate went into a university, which contributed to the statistics.
Humans understand how to improve themselves, but our bandwidth to ourselves and the outside world is pathetic.
AIs are untethered by sensory organs and language.
Mobile operators have added microphones to 4G cell towers throughout Ukraine to triangulate suspicious sounds.
Starlinks provide decentralized access to the Internet both on the frontline and back in the rear. Together with batteries, solar panels, and petrol/natgas/diesel generators, they can be relied on to provide 24/7 Internet access for a while even if something happens to the ISPs. Lots of people now have them even though they are a bit expensive, and the Ukrainian government had also set up a network of locations where civilians can gather to warm up, charge their devices, and send messages over Starlink, in the worst-case scenario of a major infrastructure breakdown.
More broadly, it's harder than it seems to knock out both the entire backbone of the Ukrainian Internet network and the backbone of the mobile carriers, at once. It's easier to target the power stations. Even then, it is possible to get at least some power as long as the fossil fuel logistics are maintained. A 180W solar panel that costs around $100 can, in decent weather, provide enough power to charge a phone and power a Starlink. So power is a major problem, but it also has solutions.
Journalists who are updating these channels have their own sources in the Ukrainian air defense network as well as OSINTers who, for example, monitor Russian radio traffic using SDR, or even sometimes have people on the ground observing the take-off of planes in Russia and Belarus (horrifically dangerous, but there are ways to send this information somewhat safely; planes tend to be loud). If one of the journalists goes down for any reason, there will be other people writing updates. Each oblast also has their own channels where they announce attacks, some of them owned by the local administration, some by the emergency services. The air defenders themselves are a bit too busy to monitor and write this stuff; often, the best they can do is to write some short messages into a group chat or a Telegram bot before things go down, and even then, all parties involved have to balance providing an appropriate warning window with not letting the timing of this information to reveal the capabilities and locations of different kinds of Ukrainian observation stations. And this whole system has to be simple, since not every trained air defender is tech-savvy in general. Many don't know what an API even is. Many Ukrainians, too, wouldn't understand how to work with an API, but they can read the warnings in Telegram.
Also don't forget that the journalists who curate monitoring channels often also accept reports about the flight paths of missiles and drones from the general public, and while there are a couple of apps for that as well that send data from the phone's GPS and compass while the user is pointing the phone at the object, again, it's a matter of having several information channels that non-technical people can easily use. Even just writing to one of them that you just heard a cruise missile fly by, specifying your rough location, can be helpful, since radar coverage is not 100%. These messages then get relayed back to the people in the Ukrainian AA who are trying to intercept these things in real time.
Then there are the obvious security concerns, personal communications and group chat access can be vetted and it's hard to break the anonymity of Telegram channels from the outside to even be able to target the authors' devices with cyberattacks. While an API must be open to the world, and thus it immediately becomes a target.
It's a messy system but it works.
Kropyva is not available to the general public and it's very far from the capabilities of similar NATO systems, its strength lies in the fact that it's an Android app that can be used on cheap tablets, so it doesn't rely on the military-industrial complex provided hardware, which is safer and more robust, but far more expensive.
