Yes, I got a "Reset password instructions" email from support@bugcrowd.com at roughly 11:13 PM UTC. There is no information in the email nor the linked page about why it is necessary.
> I literally can't make heads or tails of the risk here. All I see is the very alarming and scary words "backdoor" and "ssh server" in the same sentence.
From what I've read, there is still lots of unknowns about the scope of the problem. What has been uncovered so far indicates it involves bypassing authentication in SSH.
> If this payload is loaded in openssh sshd, the RSA_public_decrypt function will be redirected into a malicious implementation. We have observed that this malicious implementation can be used to bypass authentication. Further research is being done to explain why.
Thus, an attacker maybe could use this to connect to vulnerable servers without needing to authenticate at all.
> I don't think changing argv[0] in the current process will have any effect in the /proc file system.
Yes it does. This is a standard trick for changing the process name at runtime, several daemons do this to change the process name of child processes created by fork() that aren't separate executable. For instance, OpenSSH's sshd sets the child-process for a session to "sshd: USERNAME [priv]".
`exec -a` lets you set argv[0] through an execve() call, but many times you want to set it without exec'ing a new program.
On Linux, reading /proc/<pid>/cmdline literally asks the kernel to reach into the target process's address space and fish out its argv[0]. This, erm... has some corner cases:
The argv array (and the envp array) are in a page the kernel set up when it created the process, and the kernel holds on a reference to it, and remembers the addres of those arrays in the page. The kernel doesn't need to "watch" that memory, when you read from `/proc/$pid/cmdline` or `/proc/$pid/environ`, procfs literally reads directly from $pid's memory space (remember that the kernel controls the page table, it can look in to the memory space of any process it wants to). The kernel doesn't "know" that the value changed, it just reads the current value from process' memory.
> 3.6 /proc/<pid>/comm & /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/comm
> --------------------------------------------------------
> These files provide a method to access a tasks comm value. It also allows for
> a task to set its own or one of its thread siblings comm value. The comm value
> is limited in size compared to the cmdline value, so writing anything longer
> then the kernel's TASK_COMM_LEN (currently 16 chars) will result in a truncated
> comm value.
... ... okay, now I extremely object to [[ "foo" == f* ]] not doing globbing and doing pattern matching. But, I guess Google folks have experience that this is non-confusing?